This paper empirically evaluates the effects of informative mobile applications ("apps") on spatial price competition and price dispersion in the Korean retail gasoline market. On
Introduction
When are search costs, is a market less competitive? According to Stahl's (1989) view, when informed consumers increase, market competition changes from "monopoly pricing" to "marginal cost pricing" through reduced search costs. This paper analyses whether market competition is intensified by a government policy to reduce consumer search costs in the Korean retail gasoline market.
In April 15, 2008, the Korean government introduced the "Oil Price Information Network" (the so-called "Opinet") to stabilize gasoline prices and intensify competition among stations (Kim and Kim, 2010) . Opinet is a website that provides information about both gasoline prices and gasoline station locations. Therefore, the introduction of Opinet should make the market more transparent and reduce consumer search costs. To access Opinet, consumers need a computer with access to the Internet. Due to that restriction, if consumers are on a road where the Internet is unavailable, then the effects of Opinet disappear due to difficulties in obtaining the information. Kim and Kim (2010) , who analysed the effects of the introduction of Opinet on price dispersion and price-cost margins, suggested as an energy policy that the Korean government develop and distribute instruments that can provide information about roads and are operated using mobile phones to make the market more competitive. It is unknown whether the Korean government has accepted the policy suggestion of Kim and Kim (2010) , but the Korea National Oil Corporation released the smartphone application Opinet as freeware on May 23, 2010. If consumers have smartphones, this application can provide information on gasoline prices and gasoline station locations to consumers everywhere. Thus, we can posit that mobile Opinet may reduce consumers' considerable search costs, thus potentially tightening market competition.
Most of the literature related to search costs has estimated a relationship between search costs and price dispersion.
1 For instance, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) , who have analysed the relationship between Internet use and the price of term life insurance, have found that increased Internet use significantly reduces both price and price dispersion. Kim and Kim (2010) have concluded that the introduction of Internet service providing information about gasoline prices contributes to reducing gasoline price dispersion and margins.
2 Similar to this paper but taking a different approach, Hong (2014) has shown that the introduction of smartphones has dramatically reduced both price dispersion and the average price-cost margin in the Korean retail gasoline market because smartphones provide the consumers with direct access to Opinet.
3
The literature on price dispersion explains its relationship to search costs. However, these approaches to price dispersion focus only on the consumer side. The diffusion of price information not only reduces consumer search costs but also makes the market more transparent on the producer side. According to Schultz (2005) , information on transparency has two types of effects. If producers have more information than consumers or if the ratio of informed consumers is very low, then market competition becomes weak due to collusive pricing behaviour, but if the ratio of informed consumers is increased, then market 1 In terms of frequency, Sorensen (2000) , who has analyzed the prescription-drug retail market, has found that the price dispersion of repeatedly purchased prescription drugs is significantly low. 2 Kim and Kim (2010) have approached the Korean retail gasoline market at the provincial level due to data limitations. 3 Aker (2008), who has analyzed the impact of mobile phones on grain markets in Niger, also has found that the introduction of mobile phones reduces grain price dispersion by approximately 10-16%.
competition tightens because of increased demand elasticity. Therefore, to detect the different effects of information, we must measure the market competition that can capture effects on both the producer and the consumer sides.
In the study of Schultz (2005) , for information to have an impact on market competition, goods must be differentiated because homogeneous goods are not affected by transparency. From this perspective, the retail gasoline market is a good example to use to analyse the effects of market transparency on both the producer and the consumer sides. The retail gasoline markets are well known and are defined as the locally competitive market because consumers prefer nearby stations if the quality of service and price are same as other stations (Shepard, 1991) , i.e., gasoline markets are horizontally differentiated. Gasoline stations also can establish differentiated prices by offering differentiated service, i.e., gasoline markets are vertically differentiated.
The previous literature seemed to consider price dispersion the proxy of price competition. However, price dispersion not only is reduced if all stations engage in monopoly pricing (Stahl, 1989) but also can be determined by various factors, such as seller type and spatial competition factors (Lewis, 2008) . Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the market is competitive through price dispersion alone. In this paper, unlike in the previous literature, I focus on the relationship between information and price competition instead of between information and price dispersion.
In this paper, I attempt to evaluate the effect of mobile application on price competition, particularly spatial price competition, using the structural model of Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002) . The empirical strategies and primary findings of this paper are as follows. First, I estimate an indicator of spatial price competition using the spatial econometric method. From this work, I find that the indicator of spatial price competition varies over time and shows declining trends following the release of mobile Opinet. This result means that the information makes the market more transparent and therefore, competition among retail gasoline stations becomes weak. Second, to check whether the competition indicator explains market competition, I compare retail gasoline stations' average margins to the competition indicator. The result shows that when the ratio of informed consumers is low competition and therefore the price-cost margin increase, but as the ratio of informed consumers crosses a threshold, the market becomes more competitive and therefore the margins are reduced. Finally, I test the relationship between the ratio of informed consumers and price dispersion and find that the penetration rate of the mobile Opinet creates an inverted-U relationship with price dispersion. From these results, I conclude that government policies such as developing the mobile Opinet cause market competition to intensify.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces Opinet. In section 3, I explain the empirical strategies and data. The estimation results are reported in section 4, and section 5 summarizes this paper.
What is Opinet?
The Oil Price Information Network-the so-called "Opinet"-is a website that provides information [Insert Figure 1] Opinet's price-collecting process and operating system are shown in Figure 1 and works as follows. First, if a consumer puts gasoline in his/her car at any gasoline station and pays by credit card, information about that gasoline station-such as address and price per litre-is collected through the credit card payment system and stored in a database. Second, the Korea National Oil Corporation distributes the collected data through an online map for consumers to consult. Third, consumers can browse and find gasoline prices through the Opinet website.
However, if consumers are on the road and unable to access the Internet, Opinet's search-cost-reduction effect can disappear. Consequently, Kim and Kim (2010) suggest that to further reduce consumers' search costs, the government must create an additional instrument, such as a mobile application for smartphones. 
Empirical Model and Data

Estimation model
To estimate the price competition indicator, my empirical analysis begins with the model of Pinkse et al. (2002) . They theoretically establish the Bertrand competition model in the gasoline market and derive a reaction function for each seller as follows: (1) where and are the vector of coefficients of the cost sides and cost factors of gasoline station :
and , respectively, represent an individual station's characteristics and spatial factors that affect demand for gasoline, and is competitors' regular gasoline prices. The slope of the reaction function,
, is the diversion ratio between stations and , which is a fraction of the lost customers of who would switch to as 's prices rise (Pinkse et al., 2002; Pennerstorfer, 2009) . Therefore, following
Mobley (2003), I define the slope of the reaction function as the price competition indicators because when a rival station's prices decline, station ′ gasoline demand decreases. I assume that the diversion ratio depends on the distance between stations and (Pinkse et al., 2002) because as the distance between stations and increase, the impact of station on station decreases. This assumption allows equation
(1) to represent the spatial econometric form as follows: (2) where is a slope of the reaction function, is a spatial weighting matrix, is a price vector, is a vector of control variables and is an error term. I set up each element of the spatial weighting matrix as the normalized inverse distance, as in the previous literature (Pinkse et al., 2002; Pennerstorfer, 2009) , and restrict the distance to a 3.5 km radius because the minimum longest distance to at least one competitor is 3.15 km. Gasoline prices are determined by various factors such as the station's characteristics, cost, spatial competition and demand. I consider car wash, auto mechanic, convenience store, premium gasoline station and brand dummies as the station's characteristics, with the self-service station as the cost factor (Kim and Kim, 2011) ; the number of competitors within a 3.5 km radius (Barron et al., 2004; Lewis, 2008) , the spatially weighted share of unbranded stations within a 3.5 km radius (Pennerstorfer, 2009 ) and distance to the closest competitor as the spatial competition factors; and the number of cars per household in each district as the demand factor.
Because the spatial weighting matrix depends on the distance between stations and and frequent entries to/ exits from the retail gasoline market, the spatial weighing matrix will be changed and time varying.
Thus, the coefficients of each variable and the slope of reaction function, , are also time varying because they depend on the spatial weighting matrix. To apply this context to the market, I assume that each gasoline station determines its prices through the repeated simultaneous move game. Using this assumption, I can estimate equation (2) at each time. This paper's primary objective is to detect the effects of informative mobile apps on both the producer side and the consumer side. As mentioned, when the market becomes transparent, if the ratio of informed consumers is very low, then this market environment renders the market less competitive. However, if the ratio of informed consumers crosses a threshold, the market becomes more competitive. 
Therefore, when the ratio of informed consumers increases, if price competition among stations is intensified then increases and price-cost margins decrease.
Data
The data used in this paper were collected from various sources. The data on mobile applications come from the Korea National Oil Corporation, other data such as gasoline prices and the characteristics of As mentioned in section 2, the Opinet website provides key information such as each gasoline station's address. Using those addresses, I calculated the distance between gasoline stations by collecting the latitude and longitude from Google Geocoding API and then measured the distance between gasoline stations using the Haversine formula. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 5 Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) measure the ratio of informed consumers using commuting data. 6 The data on the mobile Opinet were obtained by request to the Korea National Oil Corporation, which informed me that the distribution of the Android version of the mobile Opinet through Google Play began on November 27, 2011.
[Insert Table 1 ] Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the cross-sectional estimation results of competition within a 3.5 km radius. On average, the estimated indicator of spatial price competition is 0.75 and statistically significant. Self-service stations that can reduce their operating costs charge a lower price-44.31KRW per litre-than full-service stations. Regular gasoline prices at premium gasoline stations that sell both premium and regular gasoline are an average of 36.94 KRW per litre higher than the prices at regular gasoline stations.
Estimation Results
Measure of spatial price competition
This result is because premium gasoline stations engage in salient pricing, which means that consumers experience the quality of salience (Lee, Kim and Park, 2015) . Other papers indicate that signifiers other characteristics (i.e., auto mechanics, convenience stores), excluding car washes, are similar but insignificant.
Among the spatial factors, the share of unbranded stations within a 3.5 km radius reduces prices through the competition effect (Pennerstorfer, 2009 ).
[Insert Table 2 However, shows an increasing trend after 2013. Why did the market become less competitive after mobile Opinet was released? The answer is that mobile Opinet has a two-way effect in terms of transparency. One effect relates to the producer side and the other relates to the consumer side. When mobile Opinet was initially released, prices information was very low in the consumer side because of the low penetration rate, but it was high on the producer side. This type of market environment can make it possible for stations to engage in collusive behaviour because it is easy to detect price undercutting (Ivaldi et al., 2003; García, 2010) . However, if the ratio of informed consumers increases, then it is difficult for stations to engage in collusive behaviour of stations because the increased elasticity of demand results in weaker punishment (Schultz, 2005) . Therefore, we can conjecture that there is a U-shaped relationship between price competition and informed consumers.
Information, spatial price competition and gasoline margins
Before we move to the estimation results of the second stage, I must check whether the indicator of spatial price competition explains market competition. First, I distinguish each of the indicator's structural breaks using the multiple structural change model developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) 7 and second, I
compare the average margins between each break point.
Estimation results show that there are three break points: the 10 th week in 2010, the 5 th week in 2011, and the 18 th week in 2013 (see Figure 4 and we can say that the estimated can represent and explain market competition.
[Insert Table 3] The estimation results for the second stage are reported in Table 3 . In all of the models, the ratio of informed consumers, , shows an U-shaped relationship with the indicator of spatial price competition and an inverted-U relationship with gasoline margins caused by two-way effects. This means that when the ratio of informed consumers is low, market competition is moderated due to the transparency effect on the producer side, but if the ratio of informed consumers crosses the threshold level, then market competition is intensified because the transparency effect on the consumer side dominates that effect on the producer side.
The threshold levels in the spatial price competition and the gasoline margins are 0.22~0.26 and 0.29~0.30, respectively.
Informed consumers and price dispersion
Finally, I attempt to test the relationship between informed consumers and price dispersion to support the previous analysis. If transparency on the consumer side makes the market more competitive, then the price dispersion will show an inverted-U relationship when the ratio of informed consumers increases (Stahl, 1989; Brown and Goolsbee, 2003) .
The existing literature shows that price dispersion is determined not only by search costs but also by product-differentiated and spatial-competition factors (Barron, Taylor and Umbeck, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Jost, 2013; Pennerstorfer, Schmidt-Dengler, Schutz, Weiss and Yontcheva, 2014) . According to the literature, the number of competitors decreases price levels and reduces price dispersion (Barron et al., 2004) , but if we consider the type of seller and the composition of competitors, the relationship between the number of competitors and price dispersion significantly varies (Lewis, 2008). If we control for spatial factors and stations' characteristics, the relationship between the search cost and price dispersion consistently shows the inverted-U shape (Jost, 2013; Pennerstorfer et al., 2014) . Therefore, price dispersion can be determined not only by search costs but also by various other factors. 8 Thus, if the data are available, it is more suitable to analyse gasoline markets in a manner that considers differentiated factors such as distance or services.
7 To detect the multiple structural break points, I use the Matlab code of Bai and Perron (2003) . 8 According to Wildenbeest (2011) , who has analyzed the United Kingdom grocery market, search costs only explain 25~39% of price variations.
To analyse the effects of transparency on the consumer side, I measure price dispersion using the residual prices obtained from price regression. Lewis (2008) has obtained residual prices from estimating the fixed effects regression model-i.e., , -but Barron et al. (2004) directly considered the observed station-specific variables and spatial factors in the price regression. In the case of Lewis (2008), if time-varying characteristics determine the gasoline price, then the simple fixed effects regression may suffer from misspecification bias due to the omitted variables. 9 Therefore, I employ the model of Barron et al. (2004) when determining residual prices. The specifications of price regression are same with the spatial model except that the spatial lag is excluded and time effects such as week dummies are included.
When analysing the retail gasoline market, we must consider that the retail gasoline market is locally competitive. Thus, price dispersion must be calculated as localized. Denoting as the residual price, we can calculate the localized variance of residual prices (Lewis, 2008) . (5) where is the set of stations within a 3.5 km radius. Using this localized variance, I estimate the relationship between the ratio of informed consumers and price dispersion. The model for price dispersion is as follows:
where includes the control variables in equation (2).
[Insert Table 4] The estimated results are reported in Table 4 . In the columns for price dispersion, (4) is measured by Lewis's (2008) method and the others are measured by the residual prices in the price equations, respectively.
The estimation results from (1) to (3) show the inverted-U relationship between the ratio of informed consumers and price dispersion. This is due to market transition. When is very low, market transparency renders the market less competitive due to the effect on the producer side, thus inducing low price dispersion because collusive pricing behaviour generates low price distribution. However, if increases, price distribution also increases because stations deviate from collusive pricing behaviour. Because the effects on market transparency on the consumer side dominate on the producer side, price distribution is decreased because informed consumers increase demand elasticity. Therefore, the penetration rate of mobile Opinet eventually will reduce price dispersion. However, (4)'s estimation result fails to capture the inverted-U relationship, which I believe may be due to a misspecification of the price regression model by omitted 9 Chandra and Tappata (2011) , who have analyzed dynamic price dispersion in the U.S. retail gasoline industry, have mentioned that a fixed effect regression is only valid if station fixed effects are additively separable from station costs. They also have failed to measure the relevant price dispersion from the fixed effect regression.
variables such as the time-varying spatial competition factors.
Summary and Conclusions
To reduce consumer search costs and make the retail gasoline market more competitive, the Korean government introduced the Oil Price Information Network-the so-called Opinet. I analysed the effects of mobile Opinet on market competition in the Korean retail gasoline market, particularly in the Seoul retail gasoline market. This paper's primary findings are as follows: First, increased transparency makes the market less competitive because producers have more information than consumers. Second, when the ratio of informed consumers crosses a threshold level, the market becomes more competitive because informed consumers weaken market punishments weak. Third, there is an inverted-U relationship between the ratio of informed consumers and price dispersion, which is consistent with Stahl's view (1989) . Therefore, this paper concludes that the penetration rate of informative mobile applications intensifies price competition among gasoline stations, thereby reducing the price dispersion of gasoline.
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[ Figure 1 ] Opinet's process of collecting gasoline prices Source: Kim and Kim (2010 Source: Korea National Oil Corporation.
[ [ Figure 4 ] Structural break points and average margins for gasoline Notes: Structural break points are calculated by the Matlab code of Bai and Perron (2003) . Dashed lines are the average margin for gasoline. The margin for gasoline is the weekly average retail price of gasoline minus the weekly average wholesale supply price of refiners. In the case of spatial competition within a 3.5 km radius, the structural break points are the 10 th week in 2010, the 5 th week in 2011, and the 18 th week in 2013.
[ [ Notes: All of the variables are significant at 1%. In the price-dispersion columns, the price dispersion of (4) is measured using the fixed effects regression of Lewis (2008) . All of the price dispersions are calculated as localized dispersions.
